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Abstract: This paper outlines the evolution of the concept of global environmental 
governance, and its expression within climate-change related problem-solving 
institutions. A number of institutions address climate change on a global level, with a 
variety of institutional structures and processes. This leads to difficulties for 
comparative analysis, particularly when it comes to assessing quality of governance. 
Governance performance is important, since it helps stakeholders determine whether 
a given institution is sufficiently legitimate to merit participation, or whether their 
efforts are better served in other forums. Using a set of principles, criteria and 
indicators of governance quality, the paper provides an analysis of the ‘REDD-plus’ 
process (United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries). It highlights REDD-
plus’ strengths and weaknesses and provides a rating of institutional legitimacy. It 
concludes with some observations on the challenges facing REDD-plus, and calls for 
the development of standards to ensure institutional quality-of-governance. 
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Introduction 
 
N RECENT YEARS, ‘multi-level governance’ has been increasingly used as a 
term to replace the earlier ‘regime’ concept of international rulemaking, 
particularly influential in international relations (IR) theory.1 This follows on from 
a body of work that has arisen over the past two decades or so, which argues for a 
broader understanding of state and non-state relations than those explained by 
traditional top-down, command-control models of state authority. Modern governance 
is portrayed as essentially social-political in nature, consisting of a variety of  ‘co’-
arrangements between state and non-state actors, built around collaborative 
approaches to problem solving.2 Contemporary environmental governance, which is 
exemplified by the interactions that occur between multiple actors within 
decentralised networks functioning at all levels, demonstrates this drift especially 
                                                
1 Kees Van Kersbergen and Frans Van Waarden, “‘Governance’ as a Bridge Between Disciplines: 
Cross-disciplinary Inspiration Regarding Shifts in Governance and Problems of Governability, 
Accountability and Legitimacy”, European Journal of Political Research 43 (2004), pp. 143-171, at p. 
149. 
2 Jan Kooiman, “Findings, Speculations and Recommendations”, in Modern Governance: New 
Government Society Interactions ed. Jan Kooiman (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 249-262, at pp. 250-251. 
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strongly.3 Forest management represents one of the best policy arenas in which to 
study the new types of governance that have arisen in response to the economic, 
social and environmental dynamics of globalisation.4 This is because it is the forestry 
sector specifically that demonstrates some of the most extensive and innovative 
experiments in ‘new’ governance.5 REDD-plus is one of the most interesting of these. 
This paper examines REDD-plus in the light of contemporary developments in 
governance theory and analysis. It utilises an evaluative framework through which 
some of the different sub-institutions associated with REDD-plus can be evaluated 
and compared, based on eleven quality-of-governance indicators. Included are the 
results of two stakeholder surveys, conducted between October and November 2009 
and March and April 2010 (before and after the Copenhagen Conference of Parties – 
COP 15). These look at three institutional components of REDD-plus: the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change REDD-plus related negotiations 
(UNFCCC-REDD-plus); the United Nations REDD Programme (UN-REDD); and the 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). It concentrates on two of the most 
important sets of actors involved in REDD-plus negotiations: environmental NGOs 
and government representatives from both the global North and global South.  
 
REDD-plus: description and background  
 
It is widely recognised that without reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation the 2°C (or 450 parts per million of CO2) climate stabilization goal will 
be difficult to achieve. REDD has potential to address a source of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions larger than the entire global transportation sector.6 Deforestation 
and forest degradation account for nearly 20% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, more than the entire global transportation sector and second only to the 
energy sector.7 Towards 2030, forest-related climate change mitigation measures 
could contribute to more than a third of all CO2 emissions reductions. The IPCC 
estimates that to reach total forest mitigation potential, 35% can be fulfilled through 
reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation, 35% through improved 
management including the restoration of degraded forests, and 30% through 
afforestation and reforestation activities.8 Deforestation shows signs of decreasing in 
                                                
3 Peter Haas, “UN Conferences and Constructivist Governance of the Environment”, Global 
Governance 8: 1 (2002), pp. 73-91, at p. 74, Peter Glück, Jeremy Rayner, Benjamin Cashore, “Changes 
in the Governance of Forest Resources”, in Forests in the Global Balance ed. G. Mery, R. Alfaro, M. 
Kaninnen, and M. Lobovikov (Helsinki: IUFRO, 2005), pp. 51-74, at p. 51. 
4 Bas Arts, “Non-state Actors in Global Governance: New Arrangements Beyond the State”, in New 
Modes of Governance in the Global System: Exploring Publicness, Delegation and Inclusiveness ed. 
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Michael Zürn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 177-200, 
at p. 178. 
5 Peter Glück, Jeremy Rayner, Benjamin Cashore, “Changes in the Governance of Forest Resources”, 
in Forests in the Global Balance ed. G. Mery, R. Alfaro, M. Kaninnen, and M. Lobovikov. (Helsinki: 
IUFRO 2005), pp. 51-74 at pp. 55-64. 
6 Arild Angelsen, Sandra Brown, Cyril Loisel and Leo Peskett, Charlotte Streck and Daniel Zarin, 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD): An Options Assessment 
Report (No location: Meridian Institute, 2009) http://www.redd-oar.org/links/REDD-OAR_en.pdf, 
accessed 18 /05/2010. 
7 UN REDD Programme “About REDD-plus”, 
 http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/582/language/en-US/Default.aspx, accessed 20/05/2010.  
8 International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), REDD-plus: Scope and Options for the 
Role of Forests in Climate Change Mitigation Strategies (Washington: IUCN, 2009), 
http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/redd_scope_english.pdf, accessed 21/05/2010. 
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several countries but continues at a high rate in others. Around 13 million hectares of 
forest were converted to other uses or lost through natural causes each year in the last 
decade compared to 16 million hectares per year in the 1990s. Afforestation and 
natural expansion of forests in some countries and regions have reduced the net loss 
of forest area significantly at the global level. The net change in forest area in the 
period 2000–2010 is estimated at –5.2 million hectares per year (an area about the 
size of Costa Rica), down from –8.3 million hectares per year in the period 1990–
2000.9  
REDD addresses the problem of climate change via a range of state and non-state 
market-based mechanisms to encourage sustainable management of tropical forests, 
and thereby reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It is now formally referred to as 
REDD-plus in the wake of COP 15, to reflect the initiative’s growing emphasis on 
conserving and enhancing forests on the basis of their value for carbon sequestration, 
rather than simply reducing emissions.10 REDD-plus includes carbon accounting from 
the following activities: reducing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions 
from forest degradation; conservation of forest carbon stocks; sustainable 
management of forest; and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (these may be 
afforestation, reforestation and restoration activities on deforested and degraded 
lands).11 Carbon accounting refers to measuring and analysing GHG emissions and 
removals from all human induced activities. It includes estimation of baseline, 
additionality, buffers and discounts, and monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV). No approved forest carbon methodology is yet available to verify reduced 
emissions associated with reduced impact logging outside of the U.S.12  
In the Copenhagen Accord developed countries committed USD $30 billion for the 
period 2010-2012 with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. Part of 
this fund goes to REDD-plus.13 UN REDD has further predicted that financial flows 
for GHG emission reductions from REDD-plus could eventually reach up to USD $30 
billion a year. This significant North-South flow of funds would reward substantive 
reductions of carbon emissions and has the potential to support new, pro-poor 
development, help conserve biodiversity and secure vital ecosystem services. 
Effective implementation of REDD-plus could reduce global deforestation by as 
much as 50% by 2020, and to zero percent by 2030.14 There are three principle 
REDD-plus-related mechanisms: the UNFCCC, responsible for the intergovernmental 
negotiations regarding the content and format of REDD-plus; The UN-REDD, which 
manages the technical and financial components of the initiative at the international 
and national level and is supported by the United Nations Development Programme 
                                                
9 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010: Key Findings 
(Rome: FAO, 2010), http://foris.fao.org/static/data/fra2010/KeyFindings-en.pdf, accessed 20/05/2010 
10 For more information, see: Charlie Parker, Andrew Mitchell, Mandar Trivedi and Niki Mardas, The 
Little REDD-plus Book (Oxford: Global Canopy Programme, 2009), pp. 11- 92. 
11 Allison Bleaney, Leo Peskett, David Mwayafu, “REDD-plus After Copenhagen: What Does it Mean 
on the Ground?” REDD-NET COP 15 Briefing, January 2010, http://6823165678770790248-a-redd--
net-org-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/redd-net.org/site/files/COP15outcome-webfinal.pdf, accessed 
20/05/2010. 
12 Bronson Griscom, David Ganz, Nicole Virgilio, Fran Price, Jeff Hayward, Rane Cortez, Gary 
Dodge, Jack Hurd, Frank L. Lowenstein, Bill Stanley, The Hidden Frontier of Forest Degradation: A 
Review of the Science, Policy and Practice of Reducing Degradation Emissions (Arlington, VA: The 
Nature Conservancy, 2009), 
http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/resources/documents/hidden_degradation.pdf, accessed 21/06/2010. 
13 Bleany et al, op. cit. 
14 Angelsen et al, op. cit. 
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(UNDP), The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP); and The World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF), which via the Bank’s Strategic Climate Fund Forest Investment 
Programme (FIP), allocates funding aimed at maintaining standing forests by 
encouraging biodiversity conservation and sustainable use through a range of country-
level projects. National governments and some NGOs such as The Nature 
Conservancy (TNC) provide funds for the initiative.15 
The ‘plus’ in REDD-plus has also widened the scope of the mechanism to include 
conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks, as well as the sustainable 
management of forests (SMF). This means that activities such as improved 
management of protected areas, forest plantations and restoration, and reduced impact 
logging may yet be elements of REDD-plus strategies. The definition of SMF, and 
specifically how it will be distinguished from ‘sustainable forest management’ (SFM) 
is not yet clear. However, the definition is certain to cover many of the community-
based forest management practices undertaken by local communities and Indigenous 
peoples. The broadening of REDD to REDD-plus is generally seen as a positive 
move.16 As there is no final and binding REDD-plus agreement, nothing in the COP 
15 draft text can be described as certain. However, negotiators at COP 15 did reach 
consensus on a number of key issues, which are extremely likely to be part of any 
agreement when it is reached. There is still ample opportunity for forest sector 
stakeholders to influence REDD-plus negotiations to ensure progressive and equitable 
outcomes benefiting both people and forests.17 Ultimately, the success of an 
international REDD-plus mechanism will depend on the existence of governance 
arrangements that are able to deliver emission reductions at scale. To ensure 
transparency and inclusiveness, decision-making processes, it is argued, should 
include a system that engages representatives of forest dependent people, civil society 
organizations, and the private sector. At the national level of implementation, 
governance arrangements, combined with verification and certification, it has been 
concluded, should follow a set of minimum standards.18 
 
Analytical Framework 
 
The ‘government to governance transition’ inherent in contemporary global 
environmental politics has led to an increased scholarly focus on institutional quality. 
Studies have tended to focus on governance arrangements, referring to a range of 
specific attributes influencing “the interaction between various actors pursuing 
                                                
15 UN-REDD, “The UN-REDD Programme” 
http://www.un-redd.org/UNREDDProgramme/tabid/583/language/en-US/Default.aspx, accessed 
23/03/2010; Anita Gordon, Stephanie Tam, Benoit Bosquet and Andre Rodrigues Aquino, Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility (Washington: Forest Carbon Finance Facility, undated), 
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/En
glish_54462_WorldBank_FCPF_Brochure.pdf, accessed 21/06/2010, pp. 6-10.  
16 The Centre for People and Forests (RECOFT), REDD-plus: Moving Forward for People and Forests 
(Bangkok: RECOFT, 2010), 
http://www.recoftc.org/site/fileadmin/docs/publications/The_Grey_Zone/2010/REDD__2010_Moving
FINAL.pdf, accessed 18 /05/2010; Bleaney et al, op. cit. 
17 RECOFT, op. cit. 
18 Charlotte Streck, Luis Gomez-Echeverri; Pablo Gutman; Cyril Loisel; Jacob Werksman, REDD+ 
Institutional Options Assessment: Developing an Efficient, Effective, and Equitable Institutional 
Framework for REDD+ under the UNFCCC, http://www.redd-oar.org/links/REDD+IOA_en.pdf, 
accessed 21/05/2010.  
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common goals.”19 Taken together, these arrangements cover matters of accountability, 
behavioural change, equality, decision-making, deliberation (or dialogue), dispute 
settlement (or conflict resolution), implementation, inclusiveness, interest 
representation, participation, problem solving, resources (or capacity) and 
transparency. New research on global governance and its relation to sustainable 
development and natural resource management (forestry) has advanced an analytical 
framework, which synthesises these previously separate arrangements around the two 
core features of any governance system: structure and process.20 The structural 
components of contemporary governance focus on those actors that are considered to 
be relevant participants. The process elements concern the deliberations within the 
institution in question relating to decision making and implementation. These core 
governance features of ‘structure as participation’ and ‘process as deliberation’ are 
articulated within a set of principles, criteria and indicators (PC&I) to determine the 
degree to which they are demonstrated within a given institution (or sub-institution), 
in this case REDD-plus.  
A principle is a value or rule to be measured. A criterion is a condition, or category 
of that principle. Principles and criteria are not usually measured directly to provide 
an estimation of the levels of compliance. As a result they are associated with 
indicators that are located in a hierarchically subordinate position and link back to the 
associated criterion, and its relevant principle. They can represent either qualitative or 
quantitative parameters, and do indicate the state, or condition, of a given system.21 
By placing these governance arrangements in such a framework it is possible to locate 
them at the correct level for consistent analysis via indicators to criteria and 
subsequently to principles. Ensuring that these elements are consistently placed at the 
appropriate level is important so as to avoid overlap or duplication at another.22 See 
Table 1 below.  
Table 1 Hierarchical framework for the assessment of governance quality 
Principle Criterion Indicator 
Inclusiveness 
Equality 
Interest representation 
Resources 
Accountability 
“Meaningful participation” 
Organisational responsibility 
Transparency 
Democracy 
Agreement 
Decision making 
Dispute settlement 
Behavioural change 
Problem solving 
“Productive deliberation” 
Implementation 
Durability 
Source: Cadman, 2009 
                                                
19 Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Introduction: Institutional Diversity in Global Governance”, in New 
Modes of Governance in the Global System: Exploring Publicness, Delegation and Inclusiveness 
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, and Michael Zürn (Basingstoke and London: Palgrave Macmillan, , 2006) 
pp. 1-30, at p. 24, Footnote 13. 
20 Timothy Cadman, Quality and Legitimacy of Global Governance: Case Lessons from Forestry 
(London: Palgrave, forthcoming) 
21 Erik M. Lammerts van Beuren and Esther M. Blom, Hierarchical Framework For The Formulation 
Of Sustainable Forest Management Standards (Leiden: The Tropenbos Foundation, 1997), pp. 20-34.  
22 Ibid, pp. 5-9. 
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In this framework the key governance concept of legitimacy, identified by many 
scholars, is not directly included, as it is understood as the end point of activity within 
the institution. Here, it is determined by the degree of successful interaction between 
the governance system’s structural and procedural components, i.e. an integrating 
model. Previous schools of thought have tended to focus on either input legitimacy  
(‘the means justify the ends’), or output legitimacy (‘the ends justify the means’).23 
The normative concept being stressed here is that the ends and means are equally 
important. Both are related and consequential one to another and both play a role in 
legitimacy. This is expressed diagrammatically in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Normative model of contemporary institutional legitimacy (Cadman 2009, 
adapted) 
 
Method 
 
Building on this framework and model, the research itself consists of two surveys and 
three associated questionnaires covering UNFCCC REDD-related negotiations, UN-
REDD and FCPF. The results provided below represent the views of environmental 
NGOs and governmental representatives, two sectors in the climate policy arena that 
could be portrayed as constituting the two ‘poles’ along the non-state/state 
                                                
23 Anne Mette Kjaer, Governance (Cambridge and Malden MA: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 7-12 and 
citing Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research 
(Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 153. 
INSTITUTION 
 
Governance 
System 
Structure 
(Participatory) 
Process 
(Deliberative) Interaction 
Inputs 
Outcomes 
(Substantive and behavioural;  
i.e. policies and/or programmes, which 
solve problems and change behaviour) 
Outputs 
 Legitimacy 
(Evaluation of 
governance 
performance) 
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governance continuum.24 The surveys asked these participants to rate their 
perceptions of the governance performance of all three institutional components, 
using a series of questions based on the indicators of Table 1 above. Each survey was 
‘static’, i.e. collected over a single period in time (approximately one month). The 
surveys were deployed pre- and post-COP 15. Participants were asked to rate their 
perceptions of the performance of the three institutional sub-components 
anonymously, by means of the Internet tool SurveyMonkey, using a Likert scale from 
‘very high’ to ‘very low’ (1-5), rounded to the second decimal point. The scores of the 
relevant indicators were added to determine performance at the criterion level. In turn, 
the relevant criteria were added to determine performance at the principle level; 
finally, the two principle scores were combined to determine overall performance (see 
Tables 2-5). In order to compare perceptions, respondents were stratified into four 
sub-groups: (1) environment North; (2) environment South; (3) government North; 
and (4) government South. Using standard statistical methods, the average ratings of 
each of the four sub-groups were in turn used to calculate the weighted averages for 
the two main groups (environment and government). In order to ascertain the overall 
perceptions of all respondents, combined weighted averages were subsequently also 
evaluated and compared. 
Perceptions of all groups and sub-groups for each of the three institutional sub-
components are presented in tabular form (Table 2-4). Where they exist, the results 
from the first survey are included (the rows of stippled grey in each of the tables). A 
single ‘grand total’ table is also included, combining the weighted average ratings 
across indicators and sub-institutional components, which could be taken as the 
‘legitimacy rating’ for REDD-plus as a whole (Table 5). Participants were recruited 
variously, either from publicly available Internet lists of named individuals active in 
UNFCCC REDD-related negotiations, UN-REDD and FCPF who were encouraged to 
circulate the invitation more widely.  
Respondents differed across surveys and questionnaires, although communications 
from individuals to the researcher indicate that there was some continuity across both 
surveys and questionnaires. Given the anonymous nature of the survey, it has not been 
possible to quantify this amount. The numbers of participants are listed in the tables 
below; bracketed figures represent the numbers of participants in the first survey. It 
should be stressed however, that given the number of participants and the restricted 
sets of interests surveyed, the results are anecdotal, rather than authoritative. 
 
Summary discussion of results 
 
The results associated with each sub-institution and for REDD-plus overall can be 
found in Tables 2-5 below. It is perhaps not surprising that governments, the main 
players in global climate change negotiations should generally rate the governance 
quality of REDD-plus higher than environmental NGOs, who, it is fair to say, are 
accorded a lesser, informal, status – even if they may actively lobby on the sidelines. 
Conversely, however, one particularly interesting feature of all the questionnaires is 
the generally higher rating given by the global South – both governmental and 
                                                
24 Andrew Jordan, Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and Anthony Zito, “The Rise of ‘New’ Policy Instruments in 
Comparative Perspectives: Has Governance Eclipsed Government?” Political Studies 53 (2005) pp. 
441-469, at pp. 492-494. There the poles are governance-to-government, but the argument has been 
extended here to encompass state-to-non-state interests along a continuum of governance authority. 
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environmental NGOs. This might seem to indicate that as an initiative ‘for’ the South 
some of the traditional North/South imbalances are reversed.  
There are a number of universal governance issues identified across the sub-
institutions of REDD-plus. The most obvious is the low rating regarding the provision 
of resources to participate meaningfully in REDD-plus. Scholars point to the need for 
money and expertise as a structural framework condition for developing 
environmental policy capable of resolving ecological problems.25 There was also a 
general low score for dispute settlement. When conflict occurs within negotiations, or 
as a result of complaints over procedure, several sources identify the need for dispute-
resolution mechanisms.26 The breakdown of processes of engagement and negotiation 
and the inability to resolve conflicts have been identified as two key indicators of 
governance failure.27 Despite their central importance to quality of governance, there 
should be some concern over the relatively unimpressive ratings across institutions for 
accountability and transparency. Governance structures need to be sufficiently robust 
to address accountability at the multiple levels of contemporary global governance.28 
Formal structures and clearly defined rules are required, otherwise transparency can 
be lost, and policy making predetermined.29 Conversely, respondents almost 
universally provided relatively high ratings for REDD-plus’ implementation capacity. 
At this stage these views are speculative as the negotiations are as yet incomplete and 
the on-the-ground projects still in the early stages of formation, but it nevertheless 
demonstrates a degree of optimism regarding REDD-plus’ ability over time to change 
behaviour contributing to, and tackle the problem of, deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries. This is encouraging since “an institution is 
effective if it contributes significantly to solving the problems that motivated its 
establishment, notably by shaping the behaviour of relevant target groups.”30 
 
                                                
25 Michael Mason, Environmental Democracy, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 72-73. See 
also Martin Jänicke, “Conditions for Environmental Policy Success: An International Comparison”, 
The Environmentalist 12 (1992), pp. 47-58, “Democracy as a Condition for Environmental Policy 
Success: the Importance of Non-institutional Factors”, in Democracy and the Environment: Problems 
and Prospects, ed. William M. Lafferty and James Meadowcroft (Cheltenham and Lyme: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 1996), pp. 71-85; “The Political System’s Capacity for Environmental Policy”, in 
Successful Environmental Policy: A Critical Evaluation ed. Martin Jänicke and Helmut Weidner, 
(Springer: Berlin, 1997). 
26 Martijn Van Vliet, “Environmental Regulation of Business: Options and Constraints for 
Communicative Governance”, in Modern Governance: New Government Society Interactions ed. Jan 
Kooiman (London: SAGE Publications, 1993) pp. 105-118, at p. 111; Errol Meidinger, “The 
Administrative Law of Global Private-public Regulation: The Case of Forestry”, The European 
Journal of International Law 17 (1) (2006), pp. 47-87, p. 25-27, Elinor Ostrom, Governing the 
Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), p. 90.  
27 Gerry Stoker, “The Challenge of Urban Government” in Debating Governance: Authority, Steering 
and Democracy, ed. Jon Pierre, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 91-109, at pp. 100-105. 
28 Katharine N. Farrell, “Recapturing Fugitive Power: Epistemology, Complexity and Democracy”, 
Local Environment 9 (5) (2004), pp. 469-470, at p. 476. 
29 Gerald Berger, “Reflections on Governance: Power Relations and Policy Making in Regional 
Sustainable Development”, Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, 5 (3) (2003), pp. 219-234, 
at pp. 224-225. 
30 Jon Birger Skjærseth, Olav Schram Stokke and Jørgen Wettestad, “Soft Law, Hard Law, and 
Effective Implementation”, Global Environmental Politics 6 (3) (2006), pp. 104-120, at p. 105, 
footnote 11, following Arild Underdal, “The Concept of Regime Effectiveness”, Cooperation and 
Conflict 27 (1992), pp. 227-240 (authors’ emphasis). 
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Concluding comments 
 
The opportunity presented by REDD-plus is unprecedented but the risks are 
considerable. To ensure it fulfils expectations and becomes part of the solution to 
climate change and not part of the problem will require a reliable monitoring system, 
which is robust, broad-based, transparent, integrated, inclusive, truly independent and 
capable of addressing governance realities on the ground.31 It is difficult, however, to 
draw any firm conclusions from such a short-term study, and one with relatively few 
participants. This paper should therefore be seen as developing some insights into the 
quality of governance and institutional legitimacy of REDD-plus, but not definitive in 
its own right. If the findings from these surveys are to be used to argue for a systemic 
improvement of sub-institutional governance across the REDD-plus mechanisms, 
longer-term investigation will be necessary to determine if the trends identified here 
are correct. Nevertheless, the methodology adopted here has the potential to be 
applied at all spatial levels of REDD-plus, global, regional, national, or local.32 It also 
allows for the creation of standards that can serve as a reference for monitoring, 
reporting and verifying institutional performance across these levels.33 It would be 
entirely possible to develop quality-of-governance standards out of the framework 
used in this study that could be applied at the global, national and local levels of 
REDD-plus. Social political interactions around climate change management are 
increasingly occurring beyond the confines of the unitary state, and in multi-level, 
multi-stakeholder contexts. In such spaces, governance standards may be the only 
means by which institutional legitimacy can be assured. Quality-of-governance 
standards will make it easier for potential participants to determine whether they 
should engage in a given initiative or not. There is currently a deal of uncertainty over 
the legitimacy of some systems, and whether participation has the potential to result in 
unwarranted institutional legitimacy. Governance standards would allow stakeholders 
to determine for themselves, on the basis of empirical evidence, rather than engage, 
and hope for the best. 
                                                
31 Global Witness, Building Confidence in REDD, Monitoring Beyond Carbon, (London: Global 
Witness, 2009) 
http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_get.php/1196/1277101361/building_confidence_in_redd_
finalen.pdf, accessed 21/06/2010. 
32 Lammerts van Beuren and Blom, op. cit. p. 7. It is noted however that: “specific spatial levels may 
require additional principles particularly relevant to that level” (ibid). 
33 Op. cit., p. 34. 
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Table 2: UNFCCC-REDD-plus related questionnaire (figures in brackets and aqua blue colours contain the results of the first survey) 
Principle 
1. Meaningful Participation 
Maximum score: 25; 
Minimum: 5 
2. Productive deliberation 
Maximum score: 30 
Minimum: 6 
Criterion 
1. Interest representation 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
2. Organisational responsibility 
Maximum score: 10 
Minimum: 2 
3. Decision-making 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
4. Implementation 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
Indicator  Inclus-iveness 
Equal-
ity 
Resour-
ces 
Criterion 
Score 
Account-
ability 
Trans-
parency 
Criterion 
Score 
Principle 
Score 
   
  Demo-cracy 
Agree-
ment 
Dispute 
settle-
ment 
Criterion 
Score 
Behav-
ioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Dura-
bility 
Criterion 
Score 
Principle 
Score 
  
  
  
Total 
(out 
of 55) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
2.67 1.83 1.00 5.50 2.60 2.67 5.27 10.77 2.20 2.17 2.20 6.57 2.60 2.60 2.67 7.87 14.44 25.21 Environment 
North 6 (19) 2.58 1.83 1.59 6.00 2.76 2.76 5.52 11.52 2.33 2.29 2.15 6.77 2.83 2.53 3.44 8.80 15.57 27.09 
3.25 2.67 2.17 8.09 3.46 3.36 6.82 14.91 2.71 2.88 2.54 8.13 3.06 2.94 3.38 9.38 17.51 32.42 Environment: 
South 17 (5) 
2.60 3.00 1.80 7.40 2.00 2.40 4.40 11.80 2.25 2.00 2.00 6.25 2.60 3.00 3.00 8.60 14.85 26.65 
3.10 2.45 1.86 7.41 3.24 3.18 6.42 13.83 2.58 2.69 2.45 7.72 2.94 2.85 3.19 8.99 16.71 30.54 Weighted 
Average 2.58 2.07 1.63 6.29 2.60 2.69 5.29 11.58 2.31 2.23 2.12 6.66 2.78 2.63 3.35 8.76 15.42 27.00 
3.33 4.00 1.00 8.33 3.00 3.67 6.67 15.00 3.33 2.67 2.33 8.33 3.67 3.67 3.00 10.34 18.67 33.67 Government 
North 3 (1) 5.00 4.00 1.00 10.00 3.00 4.00 7.00 17.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 12.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 13.00 25.00 42.00 
3.50 3.10 2.33 8.93 3.30 2.80 6.10 15.03 2.80 3.40 2.78 8.98 3.70 3.50 3.60 10.80 19.78 34.81 Government 
South 10 (5) 
3.20 2.60 2.20 8.00 3.25 3.20 6.45 14.45 3.20 3.00 2.50 8.70 2.60 2.40 2.80 7.80 16.50 30.95 
3.46 3.31 2.02 8.79 3.23 3.00 6.23 15.02 2.92 3.23 2.68 8.83 3.69 3.54 3.46 10.69 19.52 34.55 Weighted 
Average 3.50 2.83 2.00 8.33 3.21 3.33 6.54 14.88 3.33 3.17 2.75 9.25 2.83 2.67 3.17 8.67 17.92 32.79 
3.23 2.76 1.92 7.91 3.23 3.12 6.35 14.26 2.70 2.89 2.53 8.12 3.21 3.10 3.29 9.60 17.73 31.99 Combined 
Weighted 
Averages 2.77 2.23 1.71 6.70 2.72 2.81 5.54 12.24 2.52 2.42 2.25 7.18 2.79 2.64 3.31 8.74 15.92 28.16 
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Table 3: UN-REDD related questionnaire (figures in brackets and aqua blue colour contain the results of the first survey) 
Principle 
1. Meaningful Participation 
Maximum score: 25; 
Minimum: 5 
2. Productive deliberation 
Maximum score: 30 
Minimum: 6 
Criterion 
1. Interest representation 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
2. Organisational responsibility 
Maximum score: 10 
Minimum: 2 
3. Decision-making 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
4. Implementation 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
Indicator  Inclus-iveness 
Equal-
ity 
Resour-
ces 
Criterion 
Score 
Account-
ability 
Trans-
parency 
Criterion 
Score 
Principle 
Score 
  
  
  
Demo-
cracy 
Agree-
ment 
Dispute 
settle-
ment 
Criterion 
Score 
Behav-
ioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Dura-
bility 
Criterion 
Score 
Principle 
Score 
  
  
  
Total 
(out 
of 
55) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
4.00 3.00 2.00 9.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 14.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 9.00 4.00 2.50 2.00 8.50 17.50 31.50 Environment  
North 2 (3) 4.00 3.00 1.00 8.00 4.00 3.33 7.33 15.33 4.00 2.67 2.00 8.67 3.67 3.00 2.67 9.34 18.01 33.34 
3.38 3.43 3.40 20.21 3.43 2.88 6.31 16.52 3.25 3.25 2.86 9.36 3.38 3.13 3.25 9.76 19.12 35.64 Environment 
South 8 (2) 
3.00 3.50 4.00 10.50 4.00 4.00 8.00 18.50 4.00 4.00 3.00 11.00 3.50 3.50 4.00 11.00 22.00 40.50 
3.50 3.34 3.12 17.97 3.14 2.90 6.05 16.02 3.20 3.20 2.89 9.29 3.50 3.00 3.00 9.51 18.80 34.81 Weighted  
Average 3.60 3.20 2.20 9.00 4.00 3.60 7.60 16.60 4.00 3.20 2.40 9.60 3.60 3.20 3.20 10.00 19.61 36.20 
4.50 4.00 4.00 12.50 3.50 4.00 7.50 20.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 12.00 3.50 4.00 4.00 11.50 23.50 43.50 Government  
North 2 (1) (N/A) 5.00 (N/A) (N/A) 4.00 5.00 9.00 (N/A) 5.00 4.00 4.00 13.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 12.00 25.00 (N/A) 
3.17 3.17 2.33 8.67 3.33 3.33 6.66 15.33 3.17 3.60 3.60 10.37 3.80 3.80 4.00 11.60 21.97 37.30 Government  
South 6 (1) 4.00 4.00 3.00 11.00 4.00 5.00 9.00 20.00 4.00 4.00 N/A (N/A) 3.00 3.00 4.00 10.00 (N/A) (N/A) 
3.50 3.38 2.75 9.63 3.37 3.50 6.87 16.50 3.38 3.70 3.70 10.78 3.73 3.85 4.00 11.58 22.35 38.85 Weighted 
Average (N/A) 4.50 (N/A) (N/A) 4.00 5.00 9.00 (N/A) 4.50 4.00 (N/A) (N/A) 3.50 3.50 4.00 11.00 (N/A) (N/A) 
3.50 3.36 2.95 14.26 3.25 3.17 6.41 16.23 3.28 3.42 3.25 9.95 3.60 3.38 3.44 10.43 20.38 36.61 Combined weighted 
Averages (N/A) 3.57 (N/A) (N/A) 4.00 4.00 8.00 (N/A) 4.14 3.43 (N/A) (N/A) 3.57 3.29 3.43 10.29 (N/A) (N/A) 
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Table 4: FCPF related questionnaire (figures in brackets and aqua blue colour contain the results of the first survey) 
Principle 
1. Meaningful Participation 
Maximum score: 25; 
Minimum: 5 
2. Productive deliberation 
Maximum score: 30 
Minimum: 6 
Criterion 
1. Interest representation 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
2. Organisational responsibility 
Maximum score: 10 
Minimum: 2 
3. Decision-making 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
4. Implementation 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
Indicator  Inclus-iveness 
Equal-
ity 
Resour-
ces 
Criterion 
Score 
Account-
ability 
Trans-
parency 
Criterion 
Score 
Principle 
Score 
  
  
  Demo-
cracy 
Agree-
ment 
Dispute 
settle-
ment 
Criterion 
Score 
Behav-
ioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Dura-
bility 
Criterion 
Score 
Principle 
Score 
  
  
  
Total 
(out 
of 
55) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
3.00 2.00 1.00 6.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 11.00 3.50 3.00 3.00 9.50 2.50 2.50 2.00 7.00 16.50 27.50 Environment  
North 2 (1) 3.00 4.00 2.00 9.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 11.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 9.00 14.00 25.00 
3.33 3.00 1.40 7.73 2.83 2.83 5.66 13.39 2.57 2.43 2.20 7.20 3.00 2.83 3.40 9.23 16.43 29.82 Environment 
 South 7 (1) (N/A) 1.00 1.00 (N/A) 1.00 1.00 2.00 (N/A) 1.00 1.00 (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
3.26 2.78 1.31 7.35 2.65 2.87 5.51 12.86 2.78 2.56 2.38 7.71 2.89 2.76 3.09 8.73 16.45 29.30 Weighted 
Average (N/A) 2.50 1.50 (N/A) 1.00 1.00 2.00 (N/A) 1.00 1.50 (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
4.00 4.00 4.00 12.00 3.00 3.00 6.00 18.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 12.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 12.00 24.00 42.00 Government  
North 1 (2) 5.00 5.00 5.00 15.00 4.50 4.50 9.00 24.00 4.50 3.50 4.00 12.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 12.00 24.00 48.00 
2.60 2.20 3.20 8.00 3.20 2.80 6.00 14.00 3.00 2.80 2.40 8.20 2.80 2.60 2.80 8.20 16.40 30.40 Government  
South 5 (0) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
2.83 2.50 3.33 8.67 3.17 2.83 6.00 14.67 3.17 3.00 2.67 8.83 3.00 2.83 3.00 8.83 17.67 32.33 Weighted 
Average (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
3.09 2.67 2.12 7.87 2.85 2.85 5.71 13.58 2.93 2.73 2.49 8.16 2.93 2.79 3.05 8.77 16.93 30.52 Combined 
weighted 
Averages (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
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Table 5: REDD-plus ‘consensus legitimacy rating’ across indicators and sub-institutions as rated by environmental and governmental sectors (global north and south; 
Post COP-15, only) (figures in brackets and aqua blue colour contain the results of the first survey) 
Principle 
1. Meaningful Participation 
Maximum score: 25; 
Minimum: 5 
2. Productive deliberation 
Maximum score: 30 
Minimum: 6 
Criterion 
1. Interest representation 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
2. Organisational responsibility 
Maximum score: 10 
Minimum: 2 
3. Decision-making 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
4. Implementation 
Maximum score: 15 
Minimum: 3 
Indicator  Inclus-iveness 
Equal-
ity 
Resour-
ces 
Criterion 
Score 
Account-
ability 
Trans-
parency Criterion 
Score 
Principle 
Score 
  
  
  Demo-
cracy 
Agree-
ment 
Dispute 
settle-
ment 
Criterion 
Score 
Behav-
ioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Dura-
bility 
Criterion 
Score 
Principle 
Score 
  
  
  
Total 
(out of 
55) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
3.23 2.76 1.92 7.91 3.23 3.12 6.35 14.26 2.7 2.89 2.53 8.12 3.21 3.1 3.29 9.6 17.73 31.99 UNFCCC-
REDD-plus  
36 (30) 2.77 2.23 1.71 6.7 2.72 2.81 5.54 12.24 2.52 2.42 2.25 7.18 2.79 2.64 3.31 8.74 15.92 28.16 
3.5 3.36 2.95 9.81 3.25 3.17  6.42 16.23 3.28 3.42 3.25 9.95 3.6 3.38 3.44 10.43 20.38 36.61 UN-REDD 
18 (7) (N/A) 3.57 (N/A) (N/A) 4 4 8 (N/A) 4.14 3.43 (N/A) (N/A) 3.57 3.29 3.43 10.29 (N/A) (N/A) 
3.09 2.67 2.12 7.87 2.85 2.85 5.71 13.58 2.93 2.73 2.49 8.16 2.93 2.79 3.05 8.77 16.93 30.52 FCPF 
15 (4) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
3.27 2.90 2.23 9.56 3.15 3.07 6.23 14.63 2.90 2.99 2.71 8.61 3.25 3.11 3.28 9.64 18.25 32.88 Overall 
weighted 
averages  (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
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